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Deconstructing CRAC:
Teaching Proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in a Legal-Writing Program
Larry Howell
The difference between a decision and findings of fact and
conclusions of law is one in form only. Unlike a decision [that a
judge] may render in another case, the factualfindings are required
to be separate from the conclusions of law. There must be a deliber-
ate separation of these from one another.
What is deconstructedfood?
A: It's taking the parts of a dish and separating the individual
components into a new usage. The pieces should be recognizable
by themselves but when eaten together should bring about the idea
of the original dish. Think the whole is the sum of its parts.2
Recently, legal-writing programs were identified as a bright
spot in two otherwise critical examinations of the American legal-
education system, and especially its stolid reliance on the
case-dialogue, or Socratic, method of teaching.
' Joyce J. George, Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook 198 (5th ed., Hein 2007).
2 Answers, What is deconstructed food? http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What
is deconstructed food (last accessed July 1, 2012).
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Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, a
much-discussed 2007 study by the Carnegie Foundation for the
Advancement of Teaching, criticized law schools for their inad-
equate attention to actual law practice:
Unlike other professional education, . . . legal education typically
pays relatively little attention to direct training in professional prac-
tice. The result is to prolong and reinforce the habits of thinking
like a student rather than an apprentice practitioner .... .
But the study also singled out legal-writing classes as an exception.
After noting that its researchers were "impressed" with the com-
ments that many law students made about the effectiveness of their
writing classes, the Carnegie Foundation concluded: "The legal
writing courses the students were describing provide a pedagogical
experience that . .. is missing in the case-dialogue classes that make
up most of the students' first year."'
The second widely read report, Best Practices for Legal Educa-
tion, was even more blunt: "Most law school graduates are not
sufficiently competent to provide legal services to clients or even
to perform the work expected of them in large firms."' But Best
Practices again praised legal-writing courses for focusing on "con-
text-based instruction" aimed at teaching students to solve concrete
legal problems.! In addition to developing students" writing skills,
William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law
188 (Jossey-Bass 2007).
Id. at 104.
Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map
(Clinical Legal Ed. Ass'n 2007).
6 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
I Id. at 148.
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legal-writing classes "also aid the students' understanding of theory
and doctrine, sharpen their analytical skills, improve their under-
standing of the legal profession, and in some instances cultivate their
practical wisdom."'
This recognition in Educating Lawyers and Best Practices is well
deserved. Unlike much of legal education, legal-writing programs
have not continued to teach their subject as it was taught in the
middle of the last century. Instead, over the last few decades the
pedagogy of legal writing has been transformed by incorporating
composition theory, through which "students learn primarily by
being led, coached, and given abundant feedback directed to im-
proving their ability to practice legal reasoning in specific contexts."'
The praise in both reports, however, does not mean that legal-
writing programs are doing all they should to prepare students for
practice. Best Practices identified a significant weakness in the writ-
ing curriculum at most law schools: the failure to teach students
how to draft documents other than memos and briefs.
Unfortunately, law schools have not created comprehensive pro-
grams for teaching students how to produce the documents that
lawyers typically use in practice. Law schools should determine
what types of legal documents their graduates will be expected to
produce when they begin law practice and provide instruction in
how to produce such documents. After all, it does no good to teach
a student to think like a lawyer if the student cannot convey that
thinking in writing.10
Perhaps the best illustration of that shortcoming is the surpris-
ing fact that almost no law schools teach students to draft proposed
I Id. at 148-49.
9 Sullivan et al., supra n. 3, at 108.
10 Stuckey et al., supra n. 5, at 149.
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findings of fact and conclusions of law - which state and federal
trial judges routinely ask for before or after bench trials to help
them decide cases." Court rules in some jurisdictions even man-
date that attorneys submit proposed findings before trial and
authorize substantial penalties for not complying.12
Proposed findings are important not only because they help
the judge understand the lawyer's case but also because they help
the lawyer understand it. Drafting them forces a lawyer to assess
strengths and weaknesses, find the governing law for each contested
issue, and identify every significant piece of evidence needed to
prove each issue. In short, they become a detailed outline of the
lawyer's entire case, factually and legally. That a trial judge is free to
adopt one party's proposed findings verbatim only underscores this
document's importance. Although verbatim adoption is under-
standably discouraged by many appellate courts," the Supreme
Court has tacitly authorized the practice: "Those findings, though
not the product of the workings of the district judge's mind, are
formally his; they are not to be rejected out-of-hand, and they will
stand if supported by evidence."l 4
Yet, again, very few legal-writing programs teach their students
how to prepare this common and crucial document. In fact, my
See In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008 (1st Cir. 1970) ("The practice of
inviting counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law is well
established as a valuable aid to decision making.").
12 See, e.g., Mont. Unif. Dist. Ct. R. 8 ("In all matters where the court must enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52, M.R. Civ. P., all parties
shall file with the court, and serve upon all opposing parties, at least seven days prior
to the scheduled trial or hearing, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Failure to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in a timely manner
shall be cause for appropriate sanction . . . .").
" Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure vol. 9C,
5 2578, 320-21 (3d ed., Thomson West 2008).
1 U.S. v. ElPaso Nat. Gas, 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964).
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queries in 2010 on the Association of Legal Writing Directors'
listserv did not identify any law school besides the University of
Montana that makes it part of the required legal-writing courses.
The likely reason is that there's little information on the subject.
How to prepare findings is not discussed in any law-review article
or even in the more comprehensive legal-writing texts. Until now,
the only drafting information has been scattered among various
practitioner publications and is cursory at best."
An Overview of Judicial Findings and Conclusions:
Don't Bother Us with Details
Appellate judges recognize that preparing findings of fact and
conclusions of law is important and difficult:
It is sometimes said that the requirement that the trial judge file
findings of fact is for the convenience of the upper courts. While it
does serve that end, it has a far more important purpose - that of
evoking care on the part of the trial judge in ascertaining the facts.
For, as every judge knows, to set down in precise words the facts as
he finds them is the best way to avoid carelessness in the discharge
of that duty .... And it is not a light responsibility since, unless his
findings are "clearly erroneous," no upper court may disturb them.
To ascertain the facts is not a mechanical act. It is a difficult art, not
a science. It involves skill and judgment."
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, a trial judge is re-
quired to prepare formal findings of fact and separate conclusions
" See, e.g., Thomas A. Mauet, Bench Trials, 28 Litig. 13, 19 (Summer 2002); Daniel P.
Dain & John Kenneth Felter, Preparing for Civil Trial in Massachusetts 5 2.14 (Mass.
C.L.E., Inc. 2009).
6 U.S. v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-43 (2d Cir. 1942) (citation omitted).
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of law whenever the judge serves as trier of fact in a civil case."
Rule 52 also extends that obligation to decisions granting or deny-
ing temporary injunctions." The list of civil actions in which trial
judges sit as triers of fact and thus have to prepare findings is exten-
sive. They include bankruptcy, copyright, patent, condemnation,
forfeiture, admiralty, naturalization, and habeas proceedings," as
well as claims brought against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.20 Many states have rules comparable to Rule 52.21
And a state bench trial is common in cases involving probate, guard-
ianship, divorce and child custody, adoption and parental
termination, and workers' compensation.
Requiring a judge to issue findings and conclusions serves three
important purposes: (1) giving an appellate court a clear understand-
ing of the basis for the trial court's decision;22 (2) providing a precise
record of what the court decided for purposes of res judicata and
collateral estoppel;23 and (3) ensuring that the court exercises care
in determining the facts and applying the law to them. 24 As the Su-
preme Court has noted, judges "will give more careful consideration
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) ("In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law
separately.").
" Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2).
" Wright & Miller, supra n. 13, S 2573, at 234-44.
20 28 U.S.C. 5 2402 (2006).
21 See John B. Oakley & Arthur E Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1425 (1986)
("[R]eplicas of the Federal Rules are by far the most common procedural system
among the state courts.").
22 Wright & Miller, supra n. 13, % 2571, at 219.
23 Id. at 219-20.
24 Id. at 222.
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to the problem if they are required to state not only the end result
of their inquiry, but the process by which they reached it."25
At the same time, because findings of fact are almost always
reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard,26 the amount of
explanation judges have to provide is fairly minimal and aimed only
at justifying their decision under that deferential standard, rather
than persuading the reviewing court that the decision is correct.27
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1948 amendment to Rule
52(a) explained that "the judge need only make brief, definite, per-
tinent findings," and that judges should avoid "over-elaboration of
detail or particularization of facts. "28
As a result, appellate courts "liberally" construe findings to sup-
port a trial-court judgment, "even if the findings are not as explicit
or detailed as might be desired." 29 This deference is so great that
even if a judge completely omitted an important finding, an
25 U.S. v. Merz, 376 U.S. 192, 199 (1964).
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence,
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."); see also
Wright & Miller, supra n. 13, S 2588, at 443 (noting that although Rule 52 is silent on
the standard of review for conclusions of law, appellate courts universally agree that
they are reviewed under a de novo standard).
27 See U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) ("A finding is 'clearly errone-
ous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted.").
28 Wright & Miller, supra n. 13, S 2579, at 331 n. 11.
29 In re Fordu, 201 F.3d 693, 710 (6th Cir. 1999).
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appellate court will often apply the doctrine of "implied findings"
and hold that the missing finding was in fact found.30
This highly deferential standard of review has led to inconsis-
tent court opinions over the years on whether trial-court findings
should even mention the evidence that supports the "ultimate" find-
ings on each issue. An ultimate finding of fact is one "deduced from
the evidence and is used to resolve the case."'
Many opinions from the middle of the last century agreed with
the Eighth Circuit's view, expressed shortly after Rule 52 was
adopted, that "[flindings of fact should be 'a clear and concise state-
ment of the ultimate facts, and not a statement, report, or
recapitulation of evidence from which such facts may be found or
inferred.""' The Second Circuit similarly noted that findings
"should not state the evidence or any of the reasoning upon the
evidence."" And the Ninth Circuit rejected a challenge to the suf-
ficiency of the trial court's ultimate finding that the defendant had
not committed fraud, holding rather remarkably that "it would have
been improper for the court to recite the evidence which had led it
to the conclusion."13
30 See, e.g., Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728 E2d 784,793 (6th Cir.
1984) ("If, from the facts found, other facts may be inferred which will support the
judgment, such inferences should be deemed to have been drawn by the District
Court.").
" George, supra n. 1, at 191 (also stating that "[s]uch a fact is the substantiation for the
application of the legal principle chosen").
32 Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Irvin, 134 E2d 337, 338 (8th Cir. 1943) (citation omitted).
" Peterson Lighterage & Towing Corp. v. N.Y Central R.R., 126 E2d 992, 996 (2d Cir.
1942).
" Lange v. Liberty Nat'l Ins. Co., 324 F.2d 237, 241 (9th Cir. 1963) (emphasis added).
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Even though holdings like these were widespread, they are dif-
ficult to reconcile with U.S. Supreme Court precedent." In the same
year as the Eighth Circuit case cited above, the Supreme Court criti-
cized the lack of detail in a trial court's findings, stating that they
contained only "the most general conclusions of ultimate fact. It is
impossible to tell from them upon what underlying facts the court
relied . . . ."6 According to commentators, the Supreme Court has
unmistakably indicated that "findings of fact must include as much
of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose to the reviewing
court the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclu-
sion on each factual issue."1
Today, appellate courts are much more likely to insist that find-
ings include sufficient factual support. A Second Circuit opinion
written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor before she was elevated to the
Supreme Court held that "[c]ourts are not required to provide
lengthy analyses in support of their . . . findings but they are re-
quired under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) to 'adequately explain the
subsidiary facts and methodology underlying the ultimate find-
ing.""' This is also the approach recommended in the Judicial
Opinion Writing Handbook, which states that judicial findings
should "set out express findings of fact showing how the judge
reasoned from the evidentiary facts to the ultimate fact."3 9
Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415, 422 (1943); Schneiderman v. U.S.,
320 U.S. 118, 129-30 (1943).
36 Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 129-30.
3 Wright & Miller, supra n. 13, 5 2579, at 328.
38 Henry v. Champlain Enterprises, Inc., 445 F.3d 610, 622 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted).
" George, supra n. 1, at 195.
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Proposed Findings and Conclusions:
For Attorneys, the Devil Is in the Details
Deciding how much detail to include in proposed findings is
just one of the attorney's challenges. Unlike the judge's findings,
the attorney's must persuade rather than merely decide - but do
so in the judge's neutral voice. And there's another difference:
whereas a judge's findings receive considerable deference from
an audience of appellate judges, an attorney's proposed findings
are viewed with professional skepticism by their audience, which
also happens to be the person whose views the findings purport to
represent.
Thus, the attorney has the harder job. Even under the less def-
erential approach of today's appellate judges, trial courts still need
to include only a bare minimum of subsidiary evidentiary findings
to have their ultimate findings affirmed under the clearly-erroneous
standard. But if an attorney's proposed findings include only that
same bare minimum, they are unlikely to persuade the trial court to
adopt their substance, much less their wording. So proposed find-
ings have to be detailed enough to convince. Yet they should not
be so detailed that they deviate from the expected brevity inherent
in the document's format, which is more akin to a list than a brief.
Otherwise, the judge may discount the proposed findings as the
oversold product of an overzealous advocate.
The task of persuading the judge is all the more difficult be-
cause the findings of fact have to be stated separately from the
conclusions of law. 4 0 Contrast what the writer does in a brief.
Brief-writing is all about synthesis:
With rare exceptions, good legal analysis involves full develop-
ment of the legal significance of the facts. . . . The argument joins
40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
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the facts and the law, showing how both compel a favorable result.
You have to use the facts in the argument to achieve a persuasive
impact."
But having to separate proposed findings from proposed conclu-
sions makes it practically, if not literally, impossible to fully develop
the facts' legal significance. Therefore, to persuade, proposed find-
ings of fact must be stated in a way that makes their significance
implicitly clear once the reader reaches the proposed conclusions of
law.
Similarly, the judge's conclusions of law are likely to be much
less detailed than a persuasive set proposed by an attorney. The
judicial Opinion Writing Handbook, the most comprehensive sec-
ondary source on the subject, actually discourages judges from
including general principles of law in their conclusions. Instead,
every conclusion "should be tailored to the particular facts and
applied specifically."42 As an example, the Handbook states that a
judge in a slip-and-fall case should not include the general govern-
ing legal principle that "[a] failure to use ordinary care in descending
a stairway is negligence," but should state only the conclusions that
resolve the legal issue at hand. In the same slip-and-fall example,
the Handbook recommends this conclusion: "The plaintiff failed
to use ordinary care by reading a book while she was descending
the stairs. Her fall was the result of her own negligence."4
While that advice may be sound for a trial judge, an attorney
who followed it in drafting proposed conclusions of law would
disregard a widely accepted principle: "readers are more persuaded
Michael R. Fontham, Michael Vitiello & David W. Miller, Persuasive Written and
OralAdvocacy in Trial and Appellate Courts § 2.9, 45 (2d ed., Aspen 2007) (empha-
sis in original).
42 George, supra n. 1, at 239.
4 Id.
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by ideas they have first thought of themselves than by an idea first
asserted by another. This is especially true when the reader knows
that the person doing the asserting is an advocate with an admitted
persuasive agenda."" That's why, under the CRAC (Conclusion,
Rule, Application, Conclusion) paradigm for persuasive brief-
writing, the argument section should fully explain the law govern-
ing an issue before applying the law to the facts. The strategy is to
have what one legal-writing text calls the reader's "Commentator"
apply each legal point to the facts that the reader remembers from
the statement of facts, thus "lead[ing] the reader to the desired con-
clusions about rule application before the writer asserts those
conclusions."'I
Yet if a lawyer's proposed conclusions of law followed the
Handbook's advice to state only the final legal conclusion on each
issue, the conclusions would simply assert the desired result with-
out giving the judge a chance to independently apply the general
legal principle to the findings. Instead, to take advantage of the trial
judge's Commentator, proposed conclusions should do precisely
what the Handbook states judicial conclusions should not: state
the general relevant rules without reference to the facts, and then
move on to the specific conclusions where the rules are briefly
applied to the ultimate findings of fact - and perhaps to some sub-
sidiary evidentiary findings as well.
Deconstructed CRAC: Now We're Cooking
Drafting proposed findings and conclusions can become an
exercise in deconstruction. At Montana, student writers must take
" Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: Process, Analysis, and Organization 304-05 (5th
ed., Aspen 2010) (emphasis added).
" Id. at 305 (emphasis in original).
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apart their persuasive summary-judgment brief and strive for the
same effect in a completely different and purportedly neutral for-
mat. The exercise is surprisingly similar to the current high-cuisine
trend of deconstructed food, in which classic dishes are prepared
and presented in striking new ways:
At heart, any deconstructed dish should contain all the classic com-
ponents found in the "original." The difference is in the prepara-
tion. When creating a dish utilizing deconstructive techniques, the
ingredients are essentially prepared and treated on their own. It is
during the plating and presentation stages that everything is brought
together."4
One of the simpler examples of a deconstructed classic dish is
the Caesar-salad recipe published on The Atlantic magazine's website
not long ago. 7 Whole leaves from the heart of a head of romaine
lettuce are drizzled with a sauce made from olive oil, garlic, lemon
juice, and anchovies; topped with shavings of Parmigiano Reggiano
cheese; and accompanied by toasted baguette slices brushed with
olive oil, rubbed with garlic, and sprinkled with salt.48 The finished
product, intended to be eaten with the fingers, contains all the key
ingredients found in a classic Caesar salad, but its appearance and
textures are very different. Done well, a deconstructed recipe cap-
tures the essence of the original dish despite the changes in
appearance and texture and even flavor.
46 Foodie Buddha, The Art of Deconstructed Food, http://www.foodiebuddha.com/
2009/01/21/the-art-of-deconstructed-food/ (Jan. 21, 2009).
4 Sally Schneider, Recipe: Deconstructed Caesar Salad, Atlantic, http://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2009/07/recipe-deconstructed-caesar-salad/21745/
(July 22, 2009).
41 Sally Schneider, Caesar Salad as It's Meant to Be, Atlantic, http://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2009/07/caesar-salad-as-its-meant-to-be/2 1735/
(July 22, 2009).
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Similarly, proposed findings and conclusions should capture the
essence of a well-written brief. Even though the document does
not follow CRAC, lacks an argument section or even detailed analy-
sis, and is written in the trial judge's voice, it should still retain its
persuasive essence through a logical progression to ultimate find-
ings and conclusions.
The main benefit to students - and to attorneys, for that mat-
ter - comes from the act of deconstruction, which forces writers
to think about the whole brief as the sum of its parts. Just as the
deconstructed Caesar recipe required its creator to understand the
interplay of the separate ingredients, drafting proposed findings and
conclusions requires writers to understand the interplay between
the facts and the law in a way that a brief does not.
A look at creating a more complicated deconstructed recipe,
Black Forest Cake,4 illustrates the analytical process. Each com-
ponent of the recipe - the chocolate minicakes, the cherry compote,
the little pots of fudge - requires both its own individual prepara-
tion and continued focus on the goal of capturing the dessert's overall
essence. Then the final presentation requires considering how to
present the individual parts to create the most striking
whole - in this case by adding a separate dollop of whipped cream
and a cordial glass of cherry brandy to the plate containing the
other components.
That process parallels the process that writers follow in drafting
proposed findings and conclusions. They begin by identifying and
separating the different components of their brief, such as eviden-
tiary facts, ultimate facts, general rules, and subrules. From those
components, they draft each type of finding and conclusion sepa-
rately, all the while keeping in mind that the overall goal is to capture
4 Epicurious, Deconstructed Black Forest Cake, http://www.epicurious.com/reci-
pes/food/views/Deconstructed-Black-Forest-Cake-231450 (Jan. 2005).
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the essence of their brief. Finally, they have to consider how to
present the individual components, through thoughtful phrasing
and organization, to create the most effective whole.
Categories of Findings and Conclusions
To deconstruct CRAC, one must first identify the different parts.
That means labeling the different factual and legal components in
CRAC, as well as the additional types of findings contained in the
procedural-history and statement-of-facts sections of the brief.
Except for "ultimate" and "evidentiary" findings, the labels below
are not terms of art discussed in cases or secondary sources. Each
type is illustrated by examples from the sample set of proposed
findings and conclusions in the Appendix. The sample, based on
student efforts, concerns a claim of common-law marriage asserted
during probate proceedings to determine who should be the per-
sonal representative of the alleged husband's estate.
Types of Findings of Fact
Jurisdictional finding. This is usually a single finding that iden-
tifies whatever fact is necessary to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction. The finding is usually not too important in state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, but in federal courts it's fundamental
since their jurisdiction is limited by statute.s0 Jurisdiction in the pro-
bate sample is based on the decedent's domicile, so the jurisdictional
finding simply states:
1. Decedent James (Jim) McAllister was domiciled in Missoula,
Montana, at the time of his death on February 14, 2010.
so Fontham, Vitiello & Miller, supra n. 41, at 321.
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Procedural and background findings. Although the Judicial
Opinion Writing Handbook recommends including procedural his-
tory and a short statement of undisputed facts in an introductory
section rather than in the findings," I prefer to include a section of
procedural and background findings instead. Even though these
findings should not be in dispute and therefore do not actually need
to be "found" by the court, including them in the proposed find-
ings has no disadvantage and at least two advantages. First, it allows
the judge to become comfortable with the attorney's writing in the
judge's own voice before getting to the disputed findings. Second,
and more important, it allows the attorney to begin subtly struc-
turing the narrative for persuasion through emphasis and placement,
just as in a brief's statement of facts. For instance, the last proce-
dural finding in the sample simply states the arguments on which
the purported wife, Tracy, based her claim of a valid common-law
marriage with the decedent, Jim:
6. Tracy argued that the death of Jim's first wife, Diane, removed
the impediment to a lawful common-law marriage between
Tracy and Jim. Tracy also argued that, after mutually consent-
ing to marry by exchanging vows, she and Jim cohabited
because Jim's permanent residence remained her house in
Missoula, despite his extensive absence for business. Finally,
Tracy argued that she and Jim had begun to establish their repu-
tation as a married couple among their friends before his un-
timely death.
By ending this section with that proposed finding, the writer
has provided the judge with an early road map of where the eviden-
tiary and ultimate findings will lead, element by element, much the
way an umbrella section does at the beginning of a brief's argument
51 George, supra n. 1, at 203.
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section.5 2 But because the map is phrased neutrally - labeled as
Tracy's argument - the reader is more likely to appreciate the guid-
ance rather than resist the advocacy. And because this procedural
finding introduces the four elements of a common-law marriage -
competence, consent, cohabitation, and repute - it also allows the
writer to use those elements as topical headings for different groups
of findings.
After the proposed procedural findings come the general back-
ground findings, which begin the actual factual narrative. These
also should subtly persuade through emphasis and selection with-
out appearing to be advocacy. In the sample findings, the fact that
the decedent, Jim, undoubtedly knew he was still married when he
attempted to enter a common-law marriage with Tracy is a damag-
ing - but not legally fatal - fact that Tracy's lawyer needs to
confront and minimize. So the first background finding addresses
that fact head-on, but also puts it in a less damaging context by
noting the fleeting nature of the first marriage:
7. Jim and Diane McAllister were married in Boulder, Colorado,
on July 17, 1984. Soon after, they separated and never commu-
nicated again.
Evidentiary findings. As noted earlier, including detailed evi-
dentiary findings is one of the main differences between a persuasive
set of proposed findings and the typical bare-bones findings prepared
by a trial judge. Relevant evidentiary findings provide the crucial
support for the ultimate findings that the advocate wants adopted
on each legal issue. Without them, the proposed findings are just a
list of assertions. They should provide the same "narrative reason-
ing" as a persuasive statement of facts in a brief: "You want to tell a
story through a succession of narrated events, building facts upon
52 See Edwards, supra n. 44, at 301-02.
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other facts, choosing their order of presentation and your vocabu-
lary intentionally and strategically, such that your presentation
clearly adds up to the conclusion that you want your reader to
reach."" For example, on the key element of consent, the sample
includes the following detailed evidentiary findings to show why
the judge should find that Jim intended to marry Tracy under the
common law even though he knew he was still married to another
woman:
21. On December 5,2009, Jim consulted his attorney, Paul Metzler,
about the possibility of marrying Tracy under the common law.
Jim had read about a woman who received survivor benefits
when her common-law husband died in the World Trade Cen-
ter attacks.
22. On December 8, Metzler advised Jim that, to be married under
the common law in Montana, he and Tracy simply had to agree
to marry and then live together as husband and wife.
23. Jim then asked Metzler whether a second marriage is valid if a
first marriage had not been dissolved, and whether the second
could ever become valid. Metzler did not know and said he
would research the issue.
24. On December 14, Metzler left a voicemail message on Jim's
phone explaining that under Montana law, a second,
bigamous marriage automatically becomes valid if the first mar-
riage ends.
These evidentiary findings, although phrased neutrally, inexo-
rably lead the reader to the ultimate finding that Jim knew what he
was doing when he agreed to marry Tracy under the common law,
even though he also knew he could not legally marry her. Without
them, the writer would be asking the trial judge to accept, without
" Michael D. Murray & Christy Hallam DeSanctis, Advanced Legal Writing and Oral
Advocacy: Trials, Appeals, and Moot Court 30 (Found. Press 2009).
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support, the counterintuitive assertion that Jim's exchange of infor-
mal vows was sincere when Jim knew the law did not recognize
bigamous marriages. An appellate court might accept that unsup-
ported ultimate finding by a trial judge, but a trial judge is unlikely
to show the same deference to an advocate.
Ultimate findings. An ultimate finding makes the outcome of
an issue certain under the applicable legal rules, once the conclu-
sions of law identify them. An ultimate finding can often seem like
a conclusion of law.54 For instance, in common-law marriage cases,
consent is an element, but consent also has an ordinary nonlegal
meaning. Take the statement that "Jim and Tracy consented to
marry when they exchanged informal vows promising to take each
other as husband and wife." That could serve as both an ultimate
finding and a conclusion of law.
To avoid the appearance of reaching a legal conclusion in the
findings, a better ultimate finding would sidestep the word con-
sented and substitute a near-synonym, such as agreed or intended,
that is not a legal term of art and is not found in the applicable rule.
This technique is especially effective when coupled with a brief re-
cap of the key supporting evidence:
28. Jim and Tracy intended to enter a common-law marriage when
they explicitly exchanged vows to be one another's spouse. Their
intent to marry is further shown by Jim's conversations with
his lawyer on how to enter a valid common-law marriage, his
gift to Tracy of an expensive car titled in both their names, and
the dedication to her in his book.
Once that ultimate finding is made, no doubt remains that the
element of mutual consent will be satisfied under the rules that will
be identified in the conclusions of law. And by recapping the key
1 George, supra n. 1, at 189.
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evidence, which earlier evidentiary findings detailed, the ultimate
finding reminds the reader of those favorable facts.
Types of Conclusions of Law
A noteworthy aspect of a good set of proposed conclusions is
what's left out. Under the CRAC pattern for an argument in a brief,
the analysis must persuasively explain the rules governing each is-
sue, often through a thorough discussion of the relevant facts in
key cases." Yet a set of conclusions of law will rarely explain appli-
cable legal rules and authorities; rather, conclusions should simply
state the law and then apply it to the findings. The purpose of pro-
posed findings and conclusions is to resolve a factual dispute, not a
legal one. So similarities or differences between prior cases and the
case at hand are generally not relevant. If a dispute over the con-
trolling law existed, it should have been resolved through briefing
before the trial - and certainly before the findings and conclu-
sions are written.
Jurisdictional conclusion. This conclusion identifies the court's
legal basis for deciding the matter. As with jurisdictional findings of
fact, in state trial courts of general jurisdiction it's generally a for-
mality and might not be accompanied by a citation. But in federal
court, the precise statutory basis must be identified:
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the dece-
dent, Jim McAllister, was domiciled in Montana at the time of
his death. Mont. Code Ann. 5 72-3-111 (2009).
General-rule conclusions. These conclusions identify the general
principles of law that control the resolution of the overall case, as
opposed to subrules that apply only to the resolution of a discrete
" Edwards, supra n. 44, at 304-05.
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legal issue or element. These general rules are the same ones that
would be stated in a brief's umbrella section at the beginning of the
argument, and they serve the same function of "provid[ing] the
judge with the context for the heart of the argument to follow."16
Besides stating the broad rules governing common-law marriage in
our sample, the general conclusions should also include favorable
statements of policy:
3. Montana recognizes common-law marriage as valid. Mont.
Code Ann. § 40-1-403.
4. Public policy favors the finding of a valid marriage. In re Estate
of Hunsaker [citation omitted here; compare the Appendix].
The law presumes that a man and woman portraying them-
selves as husband and wife have entered into a legal marriage,
S 26-1-602(30), and this presumption is "one of the strongest
known to law," In re Swanner-Renner [citation omitted].
5. To prove a common-law marriage, the party asserting it must
show the following: (1) the parties were competent to marry; (2)
they assumed marriage by mutual consent; and (3) they con-
firmed their marriage by cohabitation and public repute.
Hunsaker [citation omitted].
6. The party asserting the common-law marriage need not prove
that all the elements were satisfied instantly, but only that all
coexisted at some time. Swanner-Renner [citation omitted].
Subrule conclusions. These conclusions identify all the neces-
sary and useful subrules that the judge should consider to resolve
specific issues or elements. Although the Judicial Opinion Writing
Handbook discourages judges from including rules in their con-
clusions of law without simultaneously applying them to the case
at hand, 7 proposed conclusions are more persuasive if they first
56 Id. at 302.
1 George, supra n. 1, at 239.
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state the subrules before applying them. Again, this allows the
judge's Commentator to begin applying the subrules before the
writer does - thus leading the judge to nod in agreement when the
application conclusions that follow mirror the judge's tentative
analysis." That's the essence of persuasion under CRAC, and it
also works in this document even though the connections cannot
be made as explicitly. For maximum benefit, the subrules, while
appearing neutral, should be phrased to make the application
implicit:
7. A party lacks capacity to consent to a prohibited marriage.
S 40-1-402. Montana prohibits marriages entered into before
an earlier marriage is dissolved. S 40-1-401(1)(a).
8. Parties to a prohibited marriage who cohabit after the removal
of the impediment to their marriage become legally married on
the date the impediment is removed. S 40-1-401(2).
9. An unlawful bigamous marriage ripens into a valid marriage
when the impediment of the first marriage ends, whether through
divorce or the death of the original spouse. In re Estate of
Schanbacher [citation omitted].
To lead the judge, step-by-step, to the result stated in the appli-
cation conclusions before the judge gets to them, the writer must
understand the persuasive power that can come through phrasing
and organizing the rules. In a brief, "[e]ffective persuasive writing
requires attention to framing and refraining the law. . . ."9 In pro-
posed conclusions of law, that attention is even more important
because the conclusions lack the detailed application of law to facts
found in a brief.
8 Edwards, supra n. 44, at 305.
" Elizabeth Fajans, Mary R. Falk & Helene S. Shapo, Writing for Law Practice 223-24
(2d ed., Found. Press 2010).
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Application conclusions. These conclusions are as close as pro-
posed conclusions get to allowing synthesized analysis, so they are
essential to closing the deal with the judge. But they pose a risk
because of lawyers' tendency to treat them like a paragraph in a
brief by including extensive and detailed application of law to the
facts. Doing that deviates substantially from judicial expectations
for this document, thus reminding the skeptical audience that it is
reading the work of a paid advocate. Indeed, a key reason why
appellate courts disapprove of trial judges' verbatim adoption of
proposed findings and conclusions is that too often "they are loaded
down with argumentative overdetailed partisan matter."6o
Instead, application conclusions should concisely apply the
subrule conclusions to the most crucial evidentiary findings and
relevant ultimate finding in just one or two sentences - like these
application conclusions that follow the competency subrule con-
clusions set out in paragraphs 7-9 above:
10. On December 14, 2009, when Jim and Tracy vowed to each
other that they would be "lawfully wedded," Jim was still le-
gally married to Diane McAllister. That marriage was an im-
pediment preventing Jim and Tracy from legally marrying.
11. Diane's death on December 20, 2009, removed the impedi-
ment of Jim's first marriage. If Tracy and Jim satisfied the re-
maining elements of common-law marriage, discussed below,
their illegal bigamous marriage would have automatically rip-
ened into a valid legal marriage the moment Diane died, and
they did not need to take any additional steps. % 40-1-401(2);
Schanbacher [citation omitted].
The application conclusions should provide just enough analy-
sis to remind the reader of the critical evidentiary and ultimate
60 Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747, 752 (3d Cir. 1965).
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findings of fact and to explain - without sounding like an advo-
cate - how they satisfy the relevant subrules.
In organizing the proposed conclusions, the writer must decide
whether to state all the subrule conclusions on an issue before ap-
plying any of them, or to apply each subrule immediately after
stating it. If the subrules are closely related, the conclusions often
flow better if all the subrule conclusions are identified before being
applied. Some subrules, however, seem to demand immediate ap-
plication before other subrules are identified.
Ultimate conclusions. The last type of conclusion is the legal
equivalent of ultimate findings of fact. Ultimate conclusions should
leave no doubt about how a particular issue is resolved, as if check-
ing it off a list:
12. Jim became legally competent to marry Tracy on December
20, 2009. Tracy's competence is not in dispute. Therefore, this
element of common-law marriage is satisfied.
A good application conclusion, such as paragraph 11 above,
can often be read as an ultimate conclusion, but expressly stating
the resolution of each issue is better as long as the phrasing is not
repetitious. The ultimate conclusion on the final issue should also
either briefly summarize the overall conclusion on the merits or be
followed by a summarizing ultimate conclusion that does so.
It should also tie up any other legal loose ends. Here is the com-
bined application and ultimate conclusion for the issue of public
repute - the final element of common-law marriage - followed
by a summarizing conclusion for the entire dispute:
33. By acknowledging their marriage publicly and to friends and
colleagues, Jim and Tracy began establishing their reputation
as a married couple. While their opportunity to fully establish
that reputation was cut short by Jim's death, they had done all
that the law requires, satisfying the element of public repute.
2011-201276 The Scribes Journal of Legal Writing
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34. In sum, Tracy has established that her marriage to Jim met all
the requirements for a valid common-law marriage. There-
fore, as the surviving spouse of a decedent who died intestate,
she has priority of appointment as personal representative of
his estate. 5 72-3-502.
Drafting Tip: Start at the End and Work Backward
The most effective way of drafting proposed findings and con-
clusions is to begin by drafting the conclusions of law. Because the
overall goal is to get the judge to reach the desired legal conclu-
sions, the writer should begin there and work backward toward
the factual findings on which the conclusions rest. By the time the
writer gets to the evidentiary findings, which are drafted last, the
central details on which the resolution depends should be clear.
Therefore, draft proposed conclusions and findings in the follow-
ing order:
(1) Jurisdictional and general conclusions
(2) Ultimate conclusions for each issue
(3) Subrule conclusions for each issue
(4) Application conclusions for each subrule
(5) Jurisdictional, procedural, and background findings
(6) Ultimate findings for each issue
(7) Evidentiary findings for each issue
Of course, as with all writing, drafting proposed findings and
conclusions is a recursive process: the writer must revisit portions
drafted earlier to revise for clarity and persuasion. One of the last
steps should be to double-check the organization, making sure that
the findings and conclusions are logically arranged and grouped
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under topical issue headings. The findings of fact should be in the
following order:
(1) Jurisdictional finding
(2) Procedural findings
(3) Background findings
(4) Evidentiary findings on the first issue
(5) Ultimate finding(s) on the first issue
(6) Repeat steps 4 and 5 for each additional issue
The conclusions of law should be in the following order, with
the conclusions on specific issues also grouped under relevant topical
headings:
(1) Jurisdictional conclusion
(2) General conclusions
(3) Subrule conclusions for first issue
(4) Application conclusions for first-issue subrules
(5) Ultimate conclusion for first issue
(6) Repeat steps 3 through 5 for each additional issue
(7) Summarizing ultimate conclusion
As pointed out earlier, sometimes the conclusions on an issue
flow better if the subrules are applied to the facts immediately. If so,
the application conclusion should immediately follow the relevant
subrule conclusion.
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For hardened gastronomes, the deconstructed meals served at
high-end restaurants like Grant Achatz's Alinea in Chicago, Wylie
Dufresne's wd-50 in New York City, and especially Ferran Adrif's
El Bulli in Spain provide an almost transcendental experience. An-
thony Bourdain once compared how a chef feels after dining at El
Bulli to how Eric Clapton felt after seeing Jimi Hendrix play guitar
for the first time: "You come out thinking 'What do I do now?"' 6 '
Although not everyone appreciates the idea of deconstruction,6 2
few would question the talent and competence of a chef who can
take apart something as simple as a toasted bagel, turn it into bagel-
flavored ice cream, mold it back into the shape of a bagel, spray-
paint it to look like the original item, and end up with something
that tastes memorable.6
It's at once more mundane and more important to take apart
the CRAC paradigm for persuasive brief-writing and then rearrange
and rephrase its components into an effective set of proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. No one ever lost a large sum of
money, or freedom, because a chef's creative new recipe did not
work out as well as hoped. And, of course, preparing persuasive
proposed findings and conclusions does not require the years of
training and expertise that successful culinary deconstruction re-
quires of its highest practitioners.
61 Colman Andrews, Chef Ferran Adria, The Greatest? L.A. Times, http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/24/food/la-fo-adria-20100624 (June 24, 2010).
62 See Christopher Borrelli, 10 Bad Dining Trends of the Last Decade, Chi. Trib.,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-10-22/entertainment/0910200330_1-
trends -food-industry-research-firm-chefs (Oct. 22, 2009).
63 Ryan Sutton, WD-50's $140 Menu Wows with Root Beer, Scrambled Egg: Food
Buzz, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-05/wd-50-s-140-
menu-wows-with-steak-and- banana-ice-cream-bagel-ryan-sutton.html (May 5,
2010).
Teaching Findings and Conclusions2011-2012 79
HeinOnline  -- 14 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 79 2011-2012
The Scribes Journal of Legal Writing 2011-2012
But it does require some. Right now, any training that lawyers
get in preparing this important document typically occurs, at best,
on the job after law school; more likely, the training comes through
trial and error when the stakes are high and the pressures great.
That should be rectified by teaching proposed findings and con-
clusions as part of the required legal-writing program in law school.
The exercise benefits students by strengthening their understand-
ing of the interplay of facts and law and their ability to write
persuasively. And it benefits the profession by better preparing
students for the actual practice of law. The alternative is, in the words
of the Carnegie Foundation, to fall back on the long-standing
law-school tradition of leaving graduates "to simply figure things
out for themselves."6 4
61 Sullivan et al., supra n. 3, at 109.
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Appendix.
Attorney #
Readem & Weep
700 Eddy Avenue
Missoula, MT 59812
(406) 243-5286
Attorney for Petitioner
MONTANA FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
COUNTY OF MISSOULA
In the Matter of Hon. Ron Bell
the Estate of Dept. No. 5
James McAllister, Probate No. 10-100
Deceased.
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter was tried on May 10, 2010, before Judge Ron Bell,
sitting without a jury. Petitioner Tracy Flick appeared and was rep-
resented by Attorney # of the firm Readem & Weep.
Objector Stuart McAllister appeared and was represented by Reece
Broderick of Witherspoon & Broderick. Having heard the evidence
and reviewed any relevant documents submitted by the parties, the
Court now makes the following findings and conclusions:
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Findings of Fact
Concerning Jurisdiction
1. Decedent James (Jim) McAllister was domiciled in Missoula, Mon-
tana, at the time of his death on February 14, 2010.
Procedural History
2. Tracy Flick filed a Petition for Adjudication of Intestacy, Deter-
mination of Heirs, and Appointment of Personal Representative
on February 17, 2010. In the Petition, Tracy asserted that Jim
died intestate and that she was entitled to be appointed personal
representative.
3. Tracy asserted her priority as Personal Representative based on
her claim that she was Jim's surviving spouse under Montana
Code Annotated 5 72-3-502 (2009), having purportedly mar-
ried Jim under the common law on December 14, 2010.
4. Jim's son, Stuart McAllister, filed an Objection to the Petition
on March 3, 2010, and petitioned to be appointed personal rep-
resentative. He disputes the validity of Tracy's alleged marriage
to Jim and asserts that he has priority because he is Jim's sole
surviving heir.
5. Stuart argued that the common-law marriage between Jim and
Tracy was prohibited by § 40-1-401(1)(a) because Jim was still
legally married to Stuart's mother, Diane McAllister, at the time.
Stuart claimed that Tracy and Jim's alleged marriage did not be-
come valid because they did not mutually consent to marriage
after Diane died on December 20, 2009. Stuart alternatively ar-
gued that the common-law marriage was invalid because Jim
and Tracy did not cohabit uninterrupted after the date of the
alleged marriage or establish the reputation of a married couple.
6. Tracy argued that the death of Jim's first wife, Diane, removed
the impediment to a lawful common-law marriage between Tracy
and Jim. Tracy also argued that, after mutually consenting to
marry by exchanging vows, she and Jim cohabited because Jim's
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permanent residence remained her house in Missoula, despite
his extensive absence for business. Finally, Tracy argued that she
and Jim had begun to establish their reputation as a married
couple among their friends before his untimely death.
Background
7. Jim and Diane McAllister were married in Boulder, Colorado,
on July 17, 1984. Soon after, they separated and never commu-
nicated again.
8. Diane had a son, Stuart, on May 24, 1985, and listed Jim
McAllister as the father on the birth certificate. She never in-
formed Jim that he had a son.
9. Tracy and Jim met in the fall of 2008, when Jim was a visiting
journalism professor and Tracy was a graduate student in one of
his classes. They began dating that fall and began living together
in June 2009. At a Halloween party in October 2009, Jim and
Tracy announced to their friends that they had become engaged.
10. On December 14, 2009, Jim and Tracy exchanged vows to be
married under the common law. The next day, Jim left on a tour
to promote his new book, but returned to Montana for Christ-
mas and New Year's.
11. On December 20, 2009, Diane McAllister died in Colorado.
Shortly before her death, she informed Stuart that Jim was his
father.
12. On January 13, 2010, Jim was admitted to a hospital in Boston,
Massachusetts, after suffering a gunshot wound to the head dur-
ing a robbery. He was unconscious when admitted, and he lapsed
into a coma.
13. While visiting Jim at the hospital, Tracy met Stuart, who told
her about his status as Jim's son and about Jim's previous mar-
riage to Diane. Tracy had not been aware that Jim was previously
married or had a son, but she does not dispute that Jim was
Stuart's father.
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14. On February 14, 2010, Jim briefly regained consciousness, and
called out for "Zelda," his nickname for Tracy. He lapsed back
into a coma and died a short time later.
Competence to Marry
15. Tracy Flick was 28 and unmarried when she and Jim exchanged
vows on December 14, 2009. Jim McAllister was 48 and married
to Diane McAllister.
16. Neither Jim nor Diane ever filed for divorce after their separa-
tion in 1984.
17. On December 14, 2009, Jim and Tracy discussed common-law
marriage, agreed to marry, and exchanged vows with one an-
other in their home.
18. After Diane died in Colorado on December 20, 2009, Jim and
Tracy continued to live together as though they were married
and did not reaffirm their agreement to marry.
Consent to Marry
19. Jim had asked Tracy to marry him on New Year's Eve 2008.
Tracy deferred her acceptance until Halloween 2009, when the
couple announced their engagement at a costume party. Because
they were in costume as E Scott and Zelda Fitzgerald, Jim an-
nounced that "Zelda" had agreed to marry him and placed a
diamond ring on her finger. "Zelda" became a term of endear-
ment between them, and their friends understood the name to
refer to Tracy.
20. Before the engagement, Jim had told Dave Novotny, dean of
the journalism school, that he wanted to marry Tracy but was
concerned that his marriage to Diane might still be valid. Jim
said he knew he needed to divorce Diane, but he was reluctant
to "open that can of worms." Nevertheless, he told Novotny
that the engagement was serious and that he intended to marry
Tracy.
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21. On December 5, 2009, Jim consulted his attorney, Paul Metzler,
about the possibility of marrying Tracy under the common law.
Jim had read about a woman who received survivor benefits
when her common-law husband died in the World Trade Cen-
ter attacks.
22. On December 8, Metzler advised Jim that, to be married under
the common law in Montana, he and Tracy simply had to agree
to marry and then live together as husband and wife.
23. Jim then asked Metzler whether a second marriage is valid if a
first marriage had not been dissolved, and whether the second
could ever become valid. Metzler did not know and said he
would research the issue.
24. On December 14, Metzler left a voicemail message on Jim's phone
explaining that under Montana law, a second, bigamous mar-
riage automatically becomes valid if the first marriage ends.
25. On the night of December 14, Jim and Tracy discussed
common-law marriage. Jim had a premonition about a forth-
coming book tour and wanted to be married before he left.
Tracy agreed, and the two exchanged vows to be "lawfully wed-
ded."
26. Jim gave Tracy a new Range Rover titled in both their names.
He explained that it was a more "practical" gift than a wedding
ring. He also showed her the dedication to "Zelda" in his new
book.
27. Jim and Tracy decided to have a formal wedding ceremony on
the following Valentine's Day to please Tracy's deceased mother.
Despite this, Tracy's friend Michele Falcone testified that Tracy
acted as though she were already married.
28. Jim and Tracy intended to enter a common-law marriage when
they explicitly exchanged vows to be one another's spouse. Their
intent to marry is further shown by Jim's conversations with
his lawyer on how to enter a valid common-law marriage, his
gift to Tracy of an expensive car titled in both their names, and
the dedication to her in his book.
2011-2012 85
HeinOnline  -- 14 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 85 2011-2012
The Scribes journal of Legal Writing 2011-2012
Cohabitation
29. In June 2009, Jim moved into Tracy's house. He and Tracy also
maintained a joint checking account to pay shared expenses and
bills.
30. Although Jim was on his book tour much of the time from
when he and Tracy exchanged vows until his death, Jim was able
to return home to Tracy for three days at Christmas and three
days at New Year's.
31. Jim began living with Tracy in June 2009 and maintained that
residence until his death on February 14, 2010.
Public Repute
32. In an interview in the New York Times about his book, Jim
explained that the dedication, which read "For Zelda, my
soulmate," referred to his "new bride." This same interview later
ran in the local newspaper on December 18, 2009, and was read
by Michele Falcone and Dave Novotny, who knew "Zelda" re-
ferred to Tracy.
33. After reading the interview, Falcone called Tracy to ask about
Jim's statement. Tracy confirmed that they had married under
the common law. Falcone testified that Tracy seemed excited
about the marriage and gave no indication that she doubted its
validity. Falcone believed they were married.
34. Novotny also called Tracy to find out if the article was true.
Tracy told him that she and Jim had married under the common
law before Jim left on his book tour. Novotny testified that
Tracy did not doubt the validity of the marriage, although she
thought it was "strange." But when he offered to announce the
marriage in the journalism school's newsletter, Tracy agreed. The
announcement never ran.
35. Jim publicly announced that he was married to Tracy in a news-
paper interview published nationally and locally. Tracy affirmed
the marriage to their friends and colleagues.
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Conclusions of Law
Jurisdiction
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the dece-
dent, Jim McAllister, was domiciled in Montana at the time of
his death. Mont. Code Ann. 5 72-3-111 (2009).
In General
2. In cases of intestacy, Montana gives the highest priority for ap-
pointment of Personal Representative to the decedent's surviving
spouse. 5 72-3-502.
3. Montana recognizes common-law marriage as valid. Mont. Code
Ann. 5 40-1-403.
4. Public policy favors the finding of a valid marriage. In re Estate
of Hunsaker, 1998 MT 279, 32, 291 Mont. 412, 968 P.2d 281.
The law presumes that a man and woman portraying themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a legal marriage, 5 26-1-
602(30), and this presumption is "one of the strongest known
to law," In re Swanner-Renner, 2009 MT 26, 21, 351 Mont.
62, 209 P.3d 328.
5. To prove a common-law marriage, the party asserting it must
show the following: (1) the parties were competent to marry;
(2) they assumed marriage by mutual consent; and (3) they con-
firmed their marriage by cohabitation and public repute.
Hunsaker, 32.
6. The party asserting the common-law marriage need not prove
that all the elements were satisfied instantly, but only that all
coexisted at some time. Swanner-Renner, 16.
Competence to Marry
7. A party lacks capacity to consent to a prohibited marriage.
5 40-1-402. Montana prohibits marriages entered into before an
earlier marriage is dissolved. § 40-1-401(1)(a).
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8. Parties to a prohibited marriage who cohabit after the removal
of the impediment to their marriage become legally married on
the date the impediment is removed. S 40-1-401(2).
9. An unlawful bigamous marriage ripens into a valid marriage when
the impediment of the first marriage ends, whether through di-
vorce or the death of the original spouse. In re Estate of
Schanbacher, 182 Mont. 176, 183, 595 P.2d 1171, 1175 (1979).
10. On December 14, 2009, when Jim and Tracy vowed to each
other that they would be "lawfully wedded," Jim was still le-
gally married to Diane McAllister. That marriage was an
impediment preventing Jim and Tracy from legally marrying.
11. Diane's death on December 20, 2009, removed the impediment
of Jim's first marriage. If Tracy and Jim satisfied the remaining
elements of common-law marriage, discussed below, their ille-
gal bigamous marriage would have automatically ripened into a
valid legal marriage the moment Diane died, and they did not
need to take any additional steps. § 40-1-401(2); Schanbacher,
182 Mont. at 183, 595 P.2d at 1175.
12. Jim became legally competent to marry Tracy on December 20,
2009. Tracy's competence is not in dispute. Therefore, this ele-
ment of common-law marriage is satisfied.
Consent to Marry
13. Consent of both parties to enter into marriage is essential to a
lawful marriage.
14. Consent need not be expressed in a particular form and can be
expressed through the exchange of vows, Swanner-Renner,
7, 22, or implied through conduct, Hunsaker, 1 34.
15. Knowledge of an impediment by either party does not affect
the validity of consent. Schanbacher, 182 Mont. at 183, 595 P.2d
at 1175.
16. The intent to formalize marriage later does not preclude finding
consent. In re Est. of Murnion, 212 Mont. 107, 114, 686 P.2d
893, 897 (1984).
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17. Jim and Tracy explicitly consented to marriage when they ex-
changed vows on December 14. They took each other as
"lawfully wedded" husband and wife with the intent to estab-
lish a common-law marriage. Jim had explained his desire to
marry under the common law, and both he and Tracy exchanged
vows with the purpose of becoming a married couple.
18. Tracy's consent is established by her own credible testimony.
Jim's consent is corroborated by considerable other evidence.
Jim sought legal counsel on how to establish a common-law
marriage, and after he found out that a common-law marriage
would become valid on the death of the former spouse, he im-
mediately asked Tracy to marry him.
19. Jim's consent can also be implied by the expensive vehicle he
gave Tracy as a wedding gift, by his dedication of his book to
Tracy, and by his statements to a New York Times reporter that
he had recently married.
20. Jim's knowledge that he was likely still married to Diane did
not negate his consent to marry. Nor did Tracy's lack of knowl-
edge of Jim's previous marriage invalidate her consent. See
Schanbacher, 182 Mont. at 183, 595 P.2d at 1175.
21. Jim and Tracy's plans to have a later formal marriage ceremony
on Valentine's Day did not invalidate their consent. Murnion,
212 Mont. at 114, 686 P.2d at 897.
22. Tracy has established that she and Jim mutually consented to
marry on December 14, 2009, satisfying this element of a
common-law marriage.
Cohabitation
23. To establish a common-law marriage, a couple must confirm
their marriage by cohabitation. Hunsaker, 32. To cohabit is to
live together "under the representation of being married." § 45-
2-101(7).
24. Cohabitation cannot be established if the parties do not intend
to live together. In re Vandenhook, 259 Mont. 201, 205, 855
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P.2d 218, 520 (1993). Intent to continue cohabitation can be
evidenced by joint ownership of property. Murnion, 212 Mont.
at 112, 686 P.2d at 896.
25. Extensive absences from home due to business travel do not
negate cohabitation. Schanbacher, 182 Mont. at 177-78, 595 P.2d
at 1172-73.
26. Jim began living with Tracy in June 2009 and continued to do
so until his death on February 14, 2010. Nothing suggests they
intended to change their living arrangements. After they ex-
changed vows on December 14, 2009, they lived together under
representation of being married by informing the public and
their friends that they had married, and by sharing a joint bank
account and joint title to a new vehicle.
27. Stuart's argument that the couple did not establish cohabitation
because they did not live together "uninterrupted" following
their consent is without merit. Jim's absences due to business
travel did not interrupt his cohabitation with Tracy.
28. The facts establish that Jim and Tracy established cohabitation,
satisfying this element of a common-law marriage.
Repute
29. After they consent to marry, parties must "enter into a course
of conduct to establish their repute as man and wife." Miller v.
Townsend Lumber Co., 152 Mont. 210, 218, 448 P.2d 148, 152
(1968).
30. A couple establishes repute when they present themselves as mar-
ried and the public views them as such. Hunsaker, [ 38. A couple
cannot establish repute if the marriage is kept secret. Vandenhook,
259 Mont. at 205, 855 P.2d at 520.
31. Because a public reputation as a married couple is created over
time, this element cannot be established instantly, but is a con-
tinuing factor during a marriage.
32. Jim and Tracy did not keep their marriage secret. Jim announced
that he was married in an article that ran in the New York Times
and in the local paper. Tracy later confirmed the marriage to
90 2011-2012
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Michele Falcone and Dave Novotny. Tracy also responded posi-
tively to Novotny's request to post an announcement of their
marriage in the journalism school's newsletter, indicating that
she wanted the public to know about the marriage.
33. By acknowledging their marriage publicly and to friends and
colleagues, Jim and Tracy began establishing their reputation as
a married couple. While their opportunity to fully establish that
reputation was cut short by Jim's death, they had done all that
the law requires, satisfying the element of public repute.
34. In sum, Tracy has established that her marriage to Jim met all
the requirements for a valid common-law marriage. Therefore,
as the surviving spouse of a decedent who died intestate, she has
priority of appointment as personal representative of his estate.
5 72-3-502.
Order
1. The Court declares that the common-law marriage between Tracy
Flick and the Decedent was lawful as of December 20, 2009.
2. The Court appoints Petitioner Tracy Flick as Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of Jim McAllister. Letters Testamentary
must be issued to her.
3. The Estate must pay the Petitioner's costs and attorney's fees,
and Stuart McAllister must pay his own costs and attorney's
fees.
Dated , 2010.
Ron Bell
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Respectfully submitted May 3, 2010.
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